Why Moscow and Tehran View the Trump Corridor as Security Threat

Growing tensions around the TRIPP corridor highlight mounting friction between the US, Russia, and Iran in the South Caucasus.

Photo: Vadim Savitsky

Baku, Azerbaijan

If Russia and Iran Coordinate Their Response

If Russia and Iran agree to block American initiatives, then the "flag” that Vance planted in Azerbaijan and Armenia will end up on an isolated island.

US Corridor and Security Risks for Russia and Iran

The Vice President of the United States visited Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 9-11 as the President's trusted representative to emphasize the importance of the TRIPP project – the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. Vance brought concrete "gifts”: agreements on supplies of supercomputers with NVIDIA chips and AI systems, cooperation in nuclear energy, and deliveries of drones and "air defense systems” for Armenia. Azerbaijan received patrol boats and investments totaling 175 million dollars in TRIPP.

From a geopolitical perspective, Vance's trip represents a "flag demonstration,” signaling that the region now falls within the zone of direct US interests. Through direct control of TRIPP, the United States gains an opportunity to contain Russia, including its base in Gyumri, as well as Iran.

The Kremlin projects calm. Press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Armenia and Azerbaijan remain sovereign states with the right to pursue their own foreign policy. He stressed that Russia intends to continue developing "deep ties with both countries in all spheres.” Russia stands ready, but do Yerevan and Baku share that readiness? Behind Peskov's composed tone lie lost positions in the South Caucasus and rising threats to Russian security.

For Iran, the creation of the TRIPP corridor presents an equally acute problem. Officials in Tehran, unlike their counterparts in Moscow, openly describe the project as "geopolitical strangulation.” Adviser to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati stated directly that Iran will block the corridor initiative "with Russia or without it.”

How the US Could Face Pressure in the Region

Three main scenarios could allow regional powers to pressure or push the Americans out of the South Caucasus, where US positions remain vulnerable due to geography, the absence of shared borders, and time constraints.

The first scenario involves Iran. With vast experience in proxy conflicts, Tehran could destabilize the Syunik region, through which TRIPP runs, using allied groups or cyber operations, making the corridor unsafe for investment. Iran could also restrict its transit routes for Armenia, placing Yerevan in full dependence on the unfinished American corridor.

The second scenario centers on Russia, which retains significant leverage over Armenia. Moscow could announce an "unscheduled technical repair” of Armenia's gas distribution network, fully owned by Gazprom Armenia, a subsidiary of Gazprom, or sharply raise prices to market levels. Such steps would halt Armenian thermal power plants, which generate roughly 40 percent of the country's electricity.

Russia could suspend fuel deliveries to the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, which provides about 30 percent of national electricity. Even if the United States pursues ambitious plans to build small modular reactors in Armenia, that process would require 10 to 15 years, while an energy collapse could unfold within a week.

Because Russian Railways manages Armenia's entire railway network under concession until 2038, Russia could halt train movement, citing strikes, technical failures, or "reorganization,” thereby paralyzing cargo transport vital for American construction projects.

The only overland route connecting Armenia to the outside world via Georgia, through the Upper Lars checkpoint and Russia, also remains vulnerable. Disruptions there could empty store shelves within days.

Armenia carries substantial debt obligations to Russia, including defense-related loans. Demands for immediate repayment or the freezing of state enterprise accounts in Russian banks would strike directly at the national budget.

Many observers may argue that such measures fall outside Russia's traditional methods, yet current realities demand pragmatism. The United States attempts to weaken Russia through economic pressure, escalatory policies, and expansion into territories that Moscow considers historically sensitive. The true nature of the Kremlin's "red lines” remains unclear. Potential triggers could include Armenia's declaration of intent to join NATO, the removal of the Russian base from Gyumri, or the nationalization of Russian assets.

Georgia's Economic Factor and the Time Constraint

The third scenario envisions coordinated actions by Russia and Iran, alongside economic incentives for Armenia. In early 2026, Russia intensified discussions about reopening transit routes through Abkhazia, into Georgia, and onward to Armenia. Reports in late 2025 indicated Russian plans to construct a major logistics hub in Abkhazia's Gali district near the Georgian border.

Economic analysts note that legal transit through Abkhazia would primarily benefit Georgia's budget through customs duties and financial flows. Tbilisi continues to deny the existence of any agreements.

The principal weakness of the American strategy lies in time. If political priorities shift in Washington by 2028, whether due to a change in administration or renewed focus on Taiwan or domestic challenges, Armenia could find itself alone with an unfinished corridor and strained regional relations, facing increasingly hostile neighbors, including Azerbaijan.

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